Asymmetry between truth and falsehood and the productivity of falsehood

Abstract

This articThis article aims to highlight the productivity of falsehood in the context of its asymmetrical position with truth. The core of the discussion can be summarized in the following statement: if only truths can be drawn from truths, it cannot be said that truth cannot be drawn from falsehood. The central thesis of the text is that the asymmetrical behavior of falsehood promotes the dissociation between the criterion (based on the conservation of truth) and the field of validity so that the latter, broader than the former, incorporates the movement not only from truth to truth, but also from falsehood to falsehood and, above all, from falsehood to truth. The distinction between the symmetrical and asymmetrical fields allows understanding, for example, the emergence of certain logical fallacies, the separation between demonstration and deduction, the thesis of Popperian fallibilism, and the use of the hypothetical-deductive method. Truth does not have functions analogous to those of falsehood.le aims to highlight how fruitful falsehood is in the context of its asymmetrical position with truth. The central point proposed here can be summarized by the Aristotelian statement that claims this: "If from the truth one can only take the truth, from falsity, on the other hand, one can take not only the false but also the true" (Prior Analytics, II, 2, 53b 6-8). The distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical fields is rich in consequences, allowing us to understand, for example, the emergence of certain logical fallacies and the separation between demonstration and deduction, as well as the thesis of Popperian fallibilism and the use of the hypothetical-deductive method in general. Within this framework, truth does not have functions analogous to falsehood.