Are there exclusionary reasons? An inquiry on a third kind of exclusionary reasons
Parole chiave:
Exclusionary reasons, Role obligations, FriendshipAbstract
Joseph Raz became well-known for his concept of exclusionary reasons, which he applied in the analysis of various practical concepts, such as decisions, rules and obligations. However, the scholarly literature displays a high degree of skepticism regarding the existence of exclusionary reasons and even the coherence of the concept itself. Throughout his work, Raz consistently focused on two types of exclusionary reasons: directly motivational reasons and evidential ones. The concept has faced numerous criticisms, likely stemming from this particular focus. In this article, I emphasize another category of exclusionary reasons that Raz neglected: reasons that are excluded by their very nature. I argue that this category not only shows that the concept is not empty or inconsistent, but also plays a crucial role in elucidating a significant moral domain, specifically, the domain of affective relationships.
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Received: 30/06/2023 – Approved: 20/11/2023 – Published: 25/03/2024
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