Iusnaturalism in front of Hume’s law

the case of the new natural law theory and its critics

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n3.13.p193

Keywords:

is-ought question, natural law, Hume's law, Ne Natural Law Theory, New Natural Law Theory

Abstract

According to authors such as Grisez and Finnis, the classical theory of natural law is immune to the criticism contained in Hume's law argument, because that theory does not pretend to derive ethics from metaphysics, nor practical statements from factual statements. These authors argue that the autonomy of practical reason allows an explanation of the theory of natural law, which does not require any recourse to metaphysics or any other theoretical knowledge of nature. This thesis has been strongly contested by authors linked to neo-Thomism, who deny the validity of the logical rule expressed in Hume's law. However, both the New Natural Law theorists and its critics seem to misunderstand Hume's law, since they do not take into account the nominalist and empiricist assumptions from which such a law is formulated by analytic philosophy.

Author Biography

  • Felipe Francisco Widow Lira, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

    Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Doctor en Derecho y Magister en Ciencia Jurídica por la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Licenciado en Humanidades por la Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez. Profesor de Filosofía del Derecho en la Facultad de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

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Recebido: 28/01/2019 - Aceito: 24/02/2020

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2020-09-10 — Updated on 2022-07-14

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Vol. 43 No. 3 (2020): July-September/2020

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How to Cite

Iusnaturalism in front of Hume’s law: the case of the new natural law theory and its critics. (2022). Trans/Form/Ação, 43(3), 193-212. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n3.13.p193