Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism

why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism

Autores

  • Ernest Sosa Rutgers University

Palavras-chave:

Virtue Epistemology, Process Reliabilism, Swamping Problem, Value of Knowledge

Resumo

This article argues for a way out of the swamping problem by showing where his virtue epistemology substantially departs from traditional process reliabilism and how such departure is enough to protect the former from issues that affect the way the latter accounts for the value of knowledge over mere true belief.

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Biografia do Autor

Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University

Departament of Philosophy at Rutgers University, New Jersey – USA.

Referências

ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Received: 21/8/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021

Publicado

02-06-2021 — Atualizado em 30-06-2022

Como Citar

Sosa, E. (2022). Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism: why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism. TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista De Filosofia Da Unesp, 44(Special Issue 2), 19–24. Recuperado de https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/11924

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