Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism
why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.03.p19Palabras clave:
Virtue Epistemology, Process Reliabilism, Swamping Problem, Value of KnowledgeResumen
This article argues for a way out of the swamping problem by showing where his virtue epistemology substantially departs from traditional process reliabilism and how such departure is enough to protect the former from issues that affect the way the latter accounts for the value of knowledge over mere true belief.
Referencias
ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Received: 21/8/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021
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