An appraisal of the evolution of some of the main themes in sosa’s epistemology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.05.p29Palabras clave:
Ernest Sosa, Virtue Epistemology, Safety, Closure, ReflectionResumen
In this article, I propose to trace the evolution of three central concepts in Sosa’s epistemology: the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, closure principles, and the safety condition. These three planks played a central role in the early presentations of Sosa’s epistemology, but have recently undergone interesting changes.
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Received: 15/9/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021
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