The neo-fregean conception of proposition in J. McDowell’s mind and world
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n4.14.p231Keywords:
Singular thought, Perception, McDowell, FregeAbstract
Traditional epistemology deals with questions such as the justification of empirical beliefs in a Cartesian representationalistic approach, which separates concepts and experience in two different metaphysical domains. But, in this way, it is difficult to explain how perception can have a normative role in the process of justification of our knowledge about the world. The solution recommended by McDowell’s Mind and Word is to consider that perception entail conceptual abilities and it provides direct access to the objects of external reality. Furthermore, McDowell endorse Evan’s neo-Fregean theory of proposition, which partly explains how the content of experience can be structured in order to meet minimal empiricism. This papers aims to analyze the consequences of Evans-McDowell’s neo-Fregean semantics for the philosophical project devised in Mind and Word. I argue that this connection between conceptualist theory of perception and semantics theory of de re senses support epistemological disjunctivism, which aims not to respond but dissipate skeptical questions.
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Recebido: 19/8/2019 - Aceito: 30/04/2020
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