Michel de Montaigne's Essays as Exercises of Judgment

Abstract

This text aims to address the concept of judgment (jugement) in Michel de Montaigne's Essays and to show how this concept - which can indicate an act, a faculty, a quality, in short, the seat of intellectual, moral, and psychological life - becomes central not only in Montaigne's thought but also in the subsequent history of philosophy. To do so, the text begins with an investigation of the concept of judgment itself, starting from its Greek roots in the Stoic logic of Chrysippus, how it was appropriated by Aristotelian and medieval philosophy, and subsequently, how Montaigne reformulates its meaning, expanding and introducing it into modern philosophy by radically modifying the very assumption of the human act of philosophizing. Ultimately, the text seeks to answer the question: what does 'judgment' mean in the Essays and what is its significance for modern philosophy?