The meaning of necessity and determinism in Spinoza

Abstract

The problem of determinism and freedom in the human being has always been a fruitful philosophical debate. In this discussion Spinoza is a reference in this regard, since since the publication of his works he has generated controversy around the problem. This work seeks to clarify the concept of necessity that Spinoza uses in his philosophy, in order to unravel the meaning of determinism that he builds from it. Within the analysis I show that in Spinoza's philosophy there is no clear distinction between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, I argue that the concepts of contingency and possibility are de dicto and not de re issues in the author's philosophy. That is to say, that they are not properties of the things themselves, but ways of speaking about them. Finally, I conclude that Spinoza's thesis on determinism should be understood mainly as a necessitarianist theory, which can be compatible with a certain sense of freedom in the human being.