Dissolving the Self: the cognitive turn of the extended mind theory

Authors

  • Léo Peruzzo Júnior PUCPR
  • Amanda Stroparo PUCPR

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46n2.p193

Keywords:

Cognition, Self, Extended mind, Brainocentrism, Andy Clark

Abstract

In this article, we intend to show how the theory of the extended mind, particularly Andy Clark’s arguments, can explain mental processes not as restrictive phenomena to the brain and endorse their connection to the body and the environment. Therefore, initially, we reconstruct the main materialist perspectives that have enclosed the self to the cranium; then, we indicate how the extended character of the mind escapes its natural limits and blends “shamelessly” into the world. We argue that external artifacts play an important role in guiding our actions, so that changes in the environment can cause changes in the behavior of the cognitive agent, what constitutes a constitutive dependence. In this way, the extended mind thesis challenges both traditional functionalism and externalism as it considers cognitive processes, on the one hand, to be relevant interactions of the individual with the environment and, on the other, intention-driven behaviors. Through the integration of biological bodies with artifacts or tools, we support a reading that dissolves the classic “explanatory gap” of cognitive sciences.

Author Biographies

  • Léo Peruzzo Júnior, PUCPR

    Professor at the Philosophy Department, Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná and FAE Centro Universitário, Curitiba, PR – Brasil. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3084-5170.

  • Amanda Stroparo, PUCPR

    PhD Student in Philosophy at Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná, Curitiba, PR – Brasil. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4774-3544.

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Received: 16/02/2022

Accept: 17/07/2022

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Published

2023-03-23

Issue

Vol. 46 No. 2 (2023): April-June/2023

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How to Cite

Dissolving the Self: the cognitive turn of the extended mind theory. (2023). Trans/Form/Ação, 46(2), 193-214. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46n2.p193