Performance epistemology and pragmatic intrusion
some general connections applied to the Sosa’s theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.08.p97Keywords:
Epistemic competence, Apt belief, Practical contextAbstract
In this paper, I will explore the connections between two salient positions in contemporary epistemology: Performance-based epistemology and pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, paying special attention to Sosa´s theory of knowledge and the arguments put forward by Stanley (2015) and Fantl and McGrath (2011). In the first section, I will review both positions. In the second section, I will try to answer a question that has been barely explored in the literature on virtues: Can a performance-based theory make room for pragmatic encroachment? I will claim that there are at least two ways in which this could occur. In the third section I will take Sosa’s discussion on the topic of pragmatic encroachment found in Judgment and Agency chapter 8, and I will argue that while Sosa’s rejection of pragmatic encroachment forces him to assume unnecessarily deep theoretical problems that are hard to solve, his theory can accommodate pragmatic encroachment in a natural way.
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Received: 20/01/2021 - Approved: 15/3/2021
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