Gnoseology according to Ernest Sosa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.07.p63Keywords:
Ernest Sosa, Telic virtue epistemology, Performance, LuckAbstract
Ernest Sosa emphasizes the difference between the theory of knowledge (or, simply, gnoseology) and intellectual ethics, within an epistemology. Indeed, such a distinction acquires strategic importance in his work, serving well the characterization of the tasks of his unique epistemology of virtues, particularly in its most recent, improved and telic version. We will thus explore the meaning proper of a gnoseology adjusted to a reliabilist view, aiming at showing how this taxonomic requirement is also associated with the analysis of the telic normativity of human performances, through which Sosa offers a unified response to the two classic Platonic questions on the nature and the value of knowledge, as well as to the challenges posed by Gettier's problem. For such a response, we will thus try to show, it is relevant to examine the relationship between the notions of ‘performance’ and ‘luck,’ as applied to the evaluation of the phenomenon of knowledge.
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Recebido: 30/9/2020 - Aprovado: 05/3/2021
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