A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the Reflective Epistemic Agency

Authors

  • Felipe Rocha Lima Santos Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)
  • Ana Margarete Barbosa de Freitas Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.12.p173

Keywords:

Virtue Epistemology, Performance Epistemology, Epistemic Agency

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss one specific feature of Sosa’s performance epistemology, which is what we call Reflective Epistemic Agency. We argue that Sosa defends a problematic version of epistemic agency on its reflective level. We contrast Sosa’s idea of reflective epistemic agency with Proust’s theory of metacognition to argue that the argument in favor of Reflective Epistemic Agency may lack some empirical plausibility, thus, it should be either revised or abandoned.

Author Biographies

  • Felipe Rocha Lima Santos, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

    Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), Salvador, BA – Brazil. Pesquisador PNPD/CAPES.

  • Ana Margarete Barbosa de Freitas, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

    Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), Salvador, BA – Brazil.

References

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Received: 22/9/2020 - Approved: 05/3/202

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Published

2021-06-02 — Updated on 2022-06-30

Issue

Vol. 44 No. Special Issue 2: Dossier Ernest Sosa/2021

Section

Articles and Comments

License

Copyright (c) 2021 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This is an article published in open access under a Creative Commons license

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How to Cite

A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the Reflective Epistemic Agency. (2022). Trans/Form/Ação, 44(Special Issue 2), 173-184. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.12.p173