Externalizing reflexivity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.09.p127Keywords:
Externalism, Reflexivity, Rationality, Cultural evolutionAbstract
The main problem for externalism in epistemology is to avoid making knowledge the result of processes of which the subject herself is unaware. Sosa accommodates this demand in his theories, but some tensions remain. As we try to understand how we think about our own beliefs, we find mechanisms that are external to the subject and cannot be internalized. The externalization of knowledge has a very large scope. A person who accepts only what she can prove is someone who refuses a large body of human knowledge. For a layperson – that is, for everyone, in some domain or other –, to assume what is the product of culture is to accept contents that remain opaque. The externalization of knowledge is a deep feature of human culture. It is maybe less usual to connect the evolution of culture with traditional concerns in epistemology.
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Recebido: 04/9/2020 - Aprovado: 05/3/2021
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