Sobre pensamentos vazios e intuições cegas. A resposta de Kant a McDowell
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732010000100005Abstract
This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell’s neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden. 2 The focus is on Kant’s twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitionsPublished
2010-01-10
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Sobre pensamentos vazios e intuições cegas. A resposta de Kant a McDowell. (2010). Trans/Form/Ação, 33(1), 65-96. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31732010000100005