Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism

why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism

Autores

  • Ernest Sosa Rutgers University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.03.p19

Palavras-chave:

Virtue Epistemology, Process Reliabilism, Swamping Problem, Value of Knowledge

Resumo

This article argues for a way out of the swamping problem by showing where his virtue epistemology substantially departs from traditional process reliabilism and how such departure is enough to protect the former from issues that affect the way the latter accounts for the value of knowledge over mere true belief.

Biografia do Autor

  • Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University

    Departament of Philosophy at Rutgers University, New Jersey – USA.

Referências

ZAGZEBSKI, Linda, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Received: 21/8/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021

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Publicado

02-06-2021 — Atualizado em 30-06-2022

Edição

v. 44 n. Special Issue 2: Dossier Ernest Sosa/2021

Seção

Artigos e Comentários

Licença

Copyright (c) 2021 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia

Creative Commons License
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto sob uma licença Creative Commons.

Como Citar

Representations, judgments, and the swamping problem for reliabilism: why the problem applies to process reliabilism, but not to virtue reliabilism. (2022). Trans/Form/Ação, 44(Special Issue 2), 19-24. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.03.p19