A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the Reflective Epistemic Agency


  • Felipe Rocha Lima Santos Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)
  • Ana Margarete Barbosa de Freitas Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)




Virtue Epistemology, Performance Epistemology, Epistemic Agency


This paper aims to discuss one specific feature of Sosa’s performance epistemology, which is what we call Reflective Epistemic Agency. We argue that Sosa defends a problematic version of epistemic agency on its reflective level. We contrast Sosa’s idea of reflective epistemic agency with Proust’s theory of metacognition to argue that the argument in favor of Reflective Epistemic Agency may lack some empirical plausibility, thus, it should be either revised or abandoned.


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Biografia do Autor

Felipe Rocha Lima Santos, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), Salvador, BA – Brazil. Pesquisador PNPD/CAPES.

Ana Margarete Barbosa de Freitas, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA)

Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), Salvador, BA – Brazil.


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Received: 22/9/2020 - Approved: 05/3/202


2021-06-02 — Atualizado em 2022-06-30

Como Citar

Lima Santos, F. R., & Freitas, A. M. B. de. (2022). A brief discussion of the empirical plausibility of the Reflective Epistemic Agency. TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista De Filosofia, 44(Special Issue 2), 173–184. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.12.p173



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