An appraisal of the evolution of some of the main themes in sosa’s epistemology

Autores

  • Juan Comesaña University of Arizona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.05.p29

Palavras-chave:

Ernest Sosa, Virtue Epistemology, Safety, Closure, Reflection

Resumo

In this article, I propose to trace the evolution of three central concepts in Sosa’s epistemology: the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, closure principles, and the safety condition. These three planks played a central role in the early presentations of Sosa’s epistemology, but have recently undergone interesting changes. 

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Biografia do Autor

Juan Comesaña, University of Arizona

University of Arizona, Tucson – United States of America

Referências

COHEN, S. Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65 (2): 309–29, 2002.

COHEN, S. Bootsrapping, Defeasible Reasoning and A Priori Justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (1), p. 141-159, 2010.

COMESAÑA, J. Unsafe Knowledge. Synthese, 146, p. 395–404, 2005.

COMESAÑA, J. Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases. In: Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, 165–78. Springer. https://link-springer-com.ezproxy2.library.arizona.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-94-007-5934-3_9, 2013.

COMESAÑA, J. Being Rational and Being Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

COMESAÑA, J., AND SARTORIO, C. Difference-Making in Epistemology. Noûs, 48 (2), p. 368–87, 2014.

GOLDMAN, A. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII (20), p. 771–91, 1976.

NOZICK, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1981.

SOSA, E. Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

SOSA, E. Postcript to ‘Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology.’ In: Jonathan Kvanvig. (Ed.): Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.

SOSA, E. How to Defeat Opposition to Moore. Philosophical Topics 174, p. 1001–37, 1999.

SOSA, E. Relevant Alternatives, Conxtextualism Included. Philosophical Studies, 119 (1/2), p. 36–65, 2004.

SOSA, E. A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, vol 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.

SOSA, E. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

WEDGWOOD, R. A Priori Bootstrapping. In: CASULLO, Albert; THUROW, Joshua C. (Eds.) The A Priori in Philoophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Received: 15/9/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021

Publicado

2021-06-02 — Atualizado em 2022-06-30

Como Citar

Comesaña, J. (2022). An appraisal of the evolution of some of the main themes in sosa’s epistemology. TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista De Filosofia, 44(Special Issue 2), 29–42. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.05.p29

Edição

Seção

Artigos e Comentários