Monismo, relaciones, y los límites de la explicación metafísica
Palavras-chave:
principio de razón suficiente, monismo, relaciones, regreso de Bradley, vacuidadResumo
En este artículo pretendo explorar los límites de una concepción de explicación metafísica basada en el Principio de Razón Suficiente (PRS). Para ello me concentraré en una de las consecuencias contraintuitivas que supuestamente se siguen de una aplicación irrestricta del PRS, a saber: el Monismo Radical. Primero, articularé dicha concepción de explicación metafísica. Luego, explicaré cómo es que de un famoso argumento que descansa sobre el PRS (el regreso de Bradley) parece efectivamente seguirse el Monismo Radical. En seguida, argumentaré en contra de la natural reacción frente a dicho argumento, a saber: aceptar el pluralismo y las relaciones como hechos brutos últimos. Finalmente, esbozaré una versión cualificada del PRS, PRS*, que nos permite sortear el Monismo Radical sin necesidad de renunciar al contenido esencial del PRS.
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Recebido: 30/10/2019 - Aceito: 04/7/2020
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