Monismo, Relaciones, Y Los Límites De La Explicación Metafísica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44n1.29.p385Keywords:
principle of sufficient reason, monism, relations, Bradley’s regress, emptinessAbstract
My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR.
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Recebido: 30/10/2019 - Aceito: 04/7/2020
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