The moral act according to Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

In considering actions that are properly human, which belong to man as man, Thomas Aquinas highlights those actions that proceed from deliberate will and aim at a certain end. This orientation is characterized as something inscribed in the very being of the creature and accompanied by knowledge of a certain kind. This article aims to study the constitution of the moral act for Aquinas. It emphasizes not only the centrality of the will in the constitution of this act, but also certain issues pertinent to Aquinas’ reflection on the moral act. For example, the voluntary/involuntary distinction, the coexistence of intelligence and will in the determination of the human act, and the qualification of action dominated by the will. It is in action that the ethical act for Aquinas is most clearly manifested, marked by the sign of prudence. The primary text referred to in this article is the second part of the Summa theologiae.

Recebido: 30/12/2019
Aceito: 30/12/2019