Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889)

a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth

Authors

  • Evandro Oliveira Brito Universidade Estadual do Centro-Oeste (UNICENTRO)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.03.p39

Keywords:

Franz Brentano, Intentionality. Truth, Correspondence, Descriptive psychology, Intentionality, Truth

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.

Author Biography

  • Evandro Oliveira Brito, Universidade Estadual do Centro-Oeste (UNICENTRO)
    Evandro O. Brito é Professor Adjunto na Universidade Estadual do Centro-Oeste (UNICENTRO), doutor e mestre em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, graduado em Filosofia e Ciências Sociais pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina. Como pesquisador, investiga o desenvolvimento da ética nas obras de Franz Brentano e está vinculado aos seguintes grupos de pesquisa: Ética Política e Cidadania (UNICENTRO); Origens da filosofia contemporânea (PUC-SP), Filosofia, arte e educação (UFSC).

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Published

2018-10-31 — Updated on 2023-02-14

Issue

Vol. 41 No. 3: July-September/2018

Section

Articles and Comments

License

Copyright (c) 2018 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This is an article published in open access under a Creative Commons license

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How to Cite

Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth. (2023). Trans/Form/Ação, 41(3), 39-56. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.03.p39