Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889)
a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
Palavras-chave:Franz Brentano, Intentionality, Truth, Correspondence, Descriptive Psychology
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
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