Skepticism and truth: essay on the radical universality of a post-skeptical thought
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.02.p9Keywords:
Epoché, Psyche, Physis, Poiesis, Skepticism, Truth, Radical universalityAbstract
Based on a study of the tropes of Aenesidemus discussed by Sextus Empiricus in his
Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, we propose a reading which leads us to the need to postulate for contemporary
thought a new universality that is radical and insurmountable. By this means, the philosophical
content and scope of skepticism can be understood in the sense of an encounter – finally – with the
much sought after notion of truth as that which can not be possessed, or whose announced possession
is always the revelation of a one-sidedness. In addition, a place of non-relativistic thought can be
secured against dogmatic intolerance and against dissatisfaction with the conflicts of philosophy.
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