G. E. M. Anscombe: an alternative to the standard philosophy of action
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2024.v47.n2.e02400275Keywords:
Anscombe, Intention, Teleological orderAbstract
The article presents a brief introduction to the investigation proposed in G. E. M. Anscombe's famous book, Intention, and highlights some central concerns that the book aimed to solve. The following discussion aims to provide a review of recent literature that proposes an enlightening interpretation of Intention. To do this, I take recent comments on the work as a basis, privileging interpretations made by philosophers who aim to understand the originality of Anscombe's method, her philosophical concerns and its context, as well as the contrast of her position with the standard theory on action, the causal theory. Finally, based on the presented review, I briefly argue that Anscombe's proposal evades Davidson's famous challenge, which is commonly treated as unavoidable.
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Recebido: 31/03/2024 – Aceito: 22/07/2024 – Publicado: 23/09/2024
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