For Old Questions, New and Better Answers: From Conceptual Engineering to Erotetic Amelioration
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p103Keywords:
Erotetic amelioration, Conceptual engineering, Concepts, Projects of ameliorationAbstract
In this paper, I present a position that I call erotetic amelioration, according to which we must evaluate and, eventually, improve our answers to questions of the form “What is x?”. My focus will be on cases where x stands for a strongly social kind, such as marriage. Such a position is offered as an alternative to the idea—sometimes called conceptual engineering—according to which we should evaluate and, eventually, seek to improve our concepts. After introducing the idea of erotetic amelioration, I will show how it can be put into work to deal with what I call the topic preservation challenge, and what advantages it has in relation to a similar position available in the literature, namely, Cappelen’s (2018) Austerity Framework.
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Recebido: 22/08/2022
Aceito: 16/01/2023
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