Para velhas perguntas, novas e melhores respostas: da engenharia conceitual ao aprimoramento erotético
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https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p103Palavras-chave:
aprimoramento, erotético, engenharia conceitual, conceitos, projetos de melhoriaResumo
Neste artigo, apresenta-se uma posição a que se chama de aprimoramento erotético, segundo a qual devemos avaliar e, eventualmente, aprimorar nossas respostas a perguntas da forma “O que é x?”. O foco será em casos em que x captura uma categoria fortemente social, como o casamento. Tal posição é oferecida enquanto alternativa à ideia — por vezes denominada engenharia conceitual — de acordo com a qual devemos avaliar e, eventualmente, buscar uma melhoria de nossos conceitos. Uma vez introduzida a ideia de aprimoramento erotético, será buscado mostrar como pode ser mobilizada para lidar com o que se chama de desafio da preservação de tópico, e que vantagens possui em relação a uma posição semelhante disponível na literatura, nomeadamente, o Quadro Austero, defendido por Cappelen (2018).
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Recebido: 22/08/2022
Aceito: 16/01/2023
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