Reflective Equilibrium and Prudence: A Process of Moral Deliberation

um processo de deliberação

Authors

  • Denis Coitinho UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46n1.p59

Keywords:

Reflective Equilibrium, Wisdom, Moral Deliberation, Moral Knowledge

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent in the reflective equilibrium procedure, adding a disposition to identify reasonable beliefs that would be seen as the starting point of the method, which could avoid the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. To do so, I will begin by analyzing the central characteristics of the method and its main faults. Afterwards, I will investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition to identify the adequate means to achieve a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure, so that it will be carried out by an agent who deliberates well, identifying reasonable moral beliefs and, then, we must justify them based on their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be taken as a kind of moral knowledge.

Author Biography

  • Denis Coitinho, UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

    Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da UNISINOS e Bolsista Produtividade do CNPq.

    Atuação na Área de Ética e Filosofia Política.

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Recebido: 19/01/2022 - Aceito: 08/07/2022

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Published

2023-01-09 — Updated on 2023-01-18

Issue

Vol. 46 No. 01 (2023): January-March/2023

Section

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How to Cite

Reflective Equilibrium and Prudence: A Process of Moral Deliberation: um processo de deliberação. (2023). Trans/Form/Ação, 46(01), 59-80. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46n1.p59