W. O. Quine's behavioristic critique
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31731980000100007Keywords:
Behaviorism, Meaning, Analyticity, Observation sentence, Theory and observationAbstract
The object of this paper is Quine's behavioristic critique of semantics and epistemology. Quine claims to have produced with this critique important contributions to the clarification of a number a notions, among them the notion of observation, or of observation sentence, a topic which is discussed here in detail. It is also discussed the precise role of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis in Quine's rejection of the doctrine of propositions.
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