Against the realist dogmatism
notes on agreements and games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44n3.23.p287Keywords:
Wittgenstein, Brandom, Normativity, Pragmatism, GamesAbstract
This paper discusses, as an alternative to a realist dogmatism, the existence of rules and criteria independent of our discursive practices by using Brandom’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. It examines the normativity of logic proposing that its constitution should be social based on an analogy with games. I defend, by using a pragmatist approach found on the notion of games and agreements, that it is not the objectivity of discourse that makes possible the normativity of our practices, but on the contrary, it is the intrinsic normativity of our practices, its set of authorizations and prohibitions, that should ground the rationality of our discourse.
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Recebido: 08/4/2020
Aceito: 30/12/2020
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