INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
Palavras-chave:Perceptual intentionalism, intentional object, hallucination, disjunctivism, biological function
In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the concept of biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.
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