Testimony and intellectual virtues in Hume’s epistemology
Palavras-chave:David Hume, testimony, miracles, virtue epistemology.
In this paper I consider some issues concerning Hume’s epistemology of testimony. I’ll particularly focus on the accusation of reductivism and individualism placed by scholars against Hume’s view on Testimonial evidence based on the 10th section of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I will first explain the arguments against Hume position, and address some replies in the literature in order to offer an alternative interpretation concerning the way such a defense should go. My strategy is closely connected with Hume’s notion of virtue and the role it plays in his epistemology, mostly as it is presented in his Treatise of Human Nature. I’ll finally address the problem concerning how the aforementioned section of the Enquiry “Of Miracles”, must be properly understood, since several misunderstanding of Hume’s epistemology of testimony emerge partially from the particular character and aim of that section.
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