Dissolvendo o self: a virada cognitiva da teoria da mente estendida

Autores

  • Léo Peruzzo Júnior PUCPR
  • Amanda Stroparo PUCPR

Palavras-chave:

cognição, self, mente estendida, cerebrocentrismo, Andy Clark

Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar como a teoria da mente estendida, particularmente os argumentos de Andy Clark, pode explicar os processos mentais não como fenômenos restritivos ao cérebro e endossar sua conexão com o corpo e o ambiente. Dessa forma, inicialmente, reconstroem-se as principais perspectivas materialistas que limitaram o self ao crânio; em seguida, aponta-se como o caráter estendido da mente escapa aos seus limites naturais e se mistura “descaradamente” ao mundo. Argumenta-se que artefatos externos desempenham um papel importante na orientação de ações, de modo que mudanças no ambiente podem causar mudanças no comportamento do agente cognitivo, configurando uma dependência constitutiva. Desse modo, a tese da mente estendida desafia tanto o funcionalismo tradicional quanto o externalismo, pois, por um lado, considera os processos cognitivos e os estados mentais como interações relevantes do indivíduo com o ambiente e, por outro, como comportamentos orientados pela intenção. Por meio da integração dos corpos biológicos com artefatos ou ferramentas, sustenta-se uma leitura que dissolve a clássica “lacuna explicativa” das ciências cognitivas.

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Biografia do Autor

Léo Peruzzo Júnior, PUCPR

Professor at the Philosophy Department, Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná and FAE Centro Universitário, Curitiba, PR – Brasil. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3084-5170.

Amanda Stroparo, PUCPR

PhD Student in Philosophy at Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná, Curitiba, PR – Brasil. Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4774-3544.

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Received: 16/02/2022

Accept: 17/07/2022

Publicado

23-03-2023

Como Citar

Peruzzo Júnior, L., & Stroparo, A. (2023). Dissolvendo o self: a virada cognitiva da teoria da mente estendida. TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista De Filosofia Da Unesp, 46(2), 193–214. Recuperado de https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/13033

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