Memory and reflection
Palavras-chave:Memory, Virtue Epistemology, Reflection
I have argued that the Analects of Confucius presents us with a conception of reflection with two components, a retrospective component and a perspective component. The former component involves hindsight or careful examination of the past and as such draws on previous learning or memory and previously formed beliefs to avoid error. The latter component is foresight, or forward looking, and as such looks to existing beliefs and factors in order to achieve knowledge. In this paper, I raise the problem of forgetting and argue that most of contemporary theories of knowledge have to face the problem and deal with the challenge seriously. In order to solve the problem, I suggest a bi-level virtue epistemology which can provide us with the best outlook for the problem-solving. I will correlate two different cognitive capacities or processes of “memory” (and “forgetting”) with the conception of reflection, and evaluate them under two different frameworks, a strict deontic framework (one that presupposes free and intentional determination) and a more loosely deontic framework (one that highlights functional and mechanical faculties). The purpose is to show that reflection as metacognition plays an important and active role and enjoys a better epistemic (normative) status in our human endeavors (cognitive or epistemic) than those of first-order (or animal) cognition, such as memory, can play.
BERNECKER, S., & GRUNDMANN, T. Knowledge from Forgetting. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(3), p. 525-540, 2019.
DESCARTES, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2, translated by J. Nottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
HUME, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. By D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000.
LOCKE, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000.
MADISON, B. J. C. “Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory.” Logos & Episteme, 5(1), p. 33-62, 2014.
MELTON, A. W. “Implications of Short-Term Memory for a General Theory of Memory.” Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2, p. 1–21, 1963.
MI, C. What Is Knowledge? When Confucius Meets Ernest Sosa. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 355-367, 2015.
MI, C. & TAN, M. T. (Forthcoming). The Problem of Forgetting.
MICHAELIAN, K. The Epistemology of Forgetting. Erkenntnis, 74(3), p. 399-424, 2011.
REID, T. (1785). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. The Works of Thomas Reid. Vol I. London : Elibron Classics, 2005.
SOSA, E. Knowing Full Well. New York: Princeton University Press, 2011.
SOSA, E. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Received: 06/10/2020 - Approved: 05/3/2021
Copyright (c) 2021 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.