What is the role of ethics in the ethics of artificial intelligence?

Authors

  • Monica Franco Doutoranda no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5705-8444

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2023.v15n39.p276-299

Keywords:

Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, Moral Theory, Conceptual Engineering

Abstract

The philosophical study of ethics concerning the interactions between human beings and technologies that deploy Artificial Intelligence has become a popular and important topic as never before. The study of problems concerning such interactions is justified because of technological transformations that human societies have gone through, and that may still lead to profound legal, political, and social changes. The main objective of this paper is to identify the role of ethics, as a philosophical discipline, concerning the recent and promising field of research of the ethics of Artificial Intelligence. After presenting the position of philosopher Peter Railton on the ethics applied to Artificial Intelligence, the paper reconstructs his explanations in normative ethics and metaethics. By illustrating the connections between the ethics applied to Artificial Intelligence and moral theory, the paper argues that the role of ethics in the ethics of Artificial Intelligence can be made explicit with the aid of conceptual engineering. This approach shows that concepts such as ‘agent’ and ‘interest,’ which are crucial for ethics, as seen in Railton’s explanations, should not be thought of exclusively by ethics, or even only by philosophy, but need to be informed by natural and human sciences. The paper emphasizes the need to accomplish the philosophical task of thinking ethics beyond ethics in an interdisciplinary context capable of dealing with complex practical problems that impact human societies.

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References

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Published

2024-01-19

Issue

Section

Artigos