Judgment, truth and reality in F. H. Bradley

Authors

  • Sebastián Briceño Domínguez USACH

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5072/0101-3173.2024.v47.nPara%20publicar.p%25p

Keywords:

Judgment, Reality, True, Bradley

Abstract

What does the truth of a judgment consist of, according to F. H. Bradley? What is its ultimate nature? In particular, how does such a property relate to reality? At least three interpretive theses have been offered: (i) that Bradley defended a theory of truth as coherence; (ii) that, rather, Bradley defended a robust variant of the identity theory of truth; and (iii) that, in any case, Bradley rejected the correspondence theory of truth. In this article I question these three theses and argue that the position defended by Bradley is perfectly compatible with a weak variant of the correspondence theory of truth. This, by the way, makes his position vulnerable to certain objections. Bradley's merit consists not so much in having answered them satisfactorily as in having anticipated them and assumed them as eventual consequences of his position.

Author Biography

References

BALDWIN, T. The identity theory of truth. Mind, v. 100, n. 1, p. 35-52, 1991.

BLACKBURN, S. Spreading the word. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

BLANSHARD, B. The nature of thought. 2 v. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939.

BRADLEY, F. H. Essays on truth and reality. Oxford: Clarendon, 1914.

BRADLEY, F. H. The principles of logic. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922.

BRADLEY, F. H. Appearance and reality: A metaphysical essay. 2. ed. 9. imp. Oxford: Clarendon, 1930.

BRADLEY, F. H. Collected essays. 2 v. Oxford: Clarendon, 1935.

CANDLISH, S. The truth about F. H. Bradley. Mind, v. 98, n. 391, p. 331-348, 1989.

CANDLISH, S. The Russell/Bradley dispute and its significance for twentieth-century philosophy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

CRESSWELL, M. J. Reality as experience in F. H. Bradley. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. 55, n. 3, p. 169-188, 1977.

DODD, J. An identity theory of truth. 2. ed. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

FERREIRA, P. Bradley and the structure of knowledge. Albany, NY: Suny, 1999.

FREGE, G. Thought. In: BEANEY, M. (ed.). The Frege reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997 [1918]. p. 325-345.

HOLDCROFT, D. Holism and truth. In: MANSER, A.; STOCK, G. (ed.). The philosophy of F. H. Bradley. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. p. 191-209.

HYLTON, P. Russell, idealism, and the emergence of analytical philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

MANDER, W. J. An introduction to Bradley’s metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994.

MANDER, W. J. Bradley: The supra-relational Absolute. In: LE POIDEVIN, R.; SIMONS, P.; MCGONIGAL, A.; CAMERON, R. P. (ed.). The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. p. 171-180.

MOORE, G. E. Truth and falsity. In: BALDWIN, T. (ed.). G. E. Moore: Selected writings. London: Routledge, 1993 [1902]. p. 20-22.

RUSSELL, B. Principles of mathematics. London: Routledge, 2010 [1903].

STOCK, G. Bradley’s theory of judgment. In: MANSER, A.; STOCK, G. (ed.). The philosophy of F. H. Bradley. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. p. 131-154.

STOCK, G. Introduction: The realistic spirit in Bradley’s philosophy. In: STOCK, G. (ed.). Appearance versus reality: New essays on Bradley’s metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. p. 1-18.

WALKER, R. C. S. Bradley’s theory of truth. In: STOCK, G. (ed.). Appearance versus reality: New essays on Bradley’s metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998. p. 93-109.

WOLLHEIM, R. F. H. Bradley. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1959.

Recibido: 05/03/2024 – Aprobado: 17/04/2024 – Publicado: 25/06/2024

Published

2023-06-20

How to Cite

Judgment, truth and reality in F. H. Bradley. (2023). Trans/Form/Ação, 47, e02400217. https://doi.org/10.5072/0101-3173.2024.v47.nPara publicar.p%p