Neutral perspectivism and the biological function of phenomenal experiences
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p601Keywords:
Neutral perspectivism, Conscious phenomenal experiences, Theories of perception, Evolutionary biology, NeurosciencesAbstract
In this paper, I argue in favor of a view on the nature of the human mind that is neither a reductionist physicalism nor any kind of dualism, whether of substance or property. I support neutral perspectivism, inspired by neutral monism, with a scientific and materialist content, which allows for the inclusion of conscious phenomenal experiences as part of causal chains of perceptive, emotional, cognitive and deliberative processes. Although there are still no theories, laws and data that allow a final decision on the role of conscious phenomenal experiences in physical-chemical processes in the body, evidence collected in recent decades does not only strengthen our belief in the correlation between physical-chemical events and qualitative conscious experiences but also increases the number of reasons in favor of the thesis that these experiences do have an important functional role in the processes of collection and use of information by the organism.
Downloads
References
BYRNE, A.; HILBERT, D. R. Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues about. In: NADEL, L. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: Nature, 2003.
CAROTA, F.; MOSELEY, R.; PULVERMÜLLER, F. Body-part-specific representations of semantic noun categories. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, v. 24, n. 6, p. 1492-509, 2012.
CHALMERS, D. How can we construct a science of consciousness? In: CHALMERS, D. The Character of Consciousness. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
CLARK, A. Being There. Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. London: Bradford Books, 1998.
DUNBAR, R. I. M. The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, v. 6, n. 5, p. 178-190, 1998.
GALLESE, V. The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: the quest for a common mechanism. In: FRITH, C.; FRITH, D.; WOLPERT, D. M. The neuroscience of social interaction: Decoding, imitating, and influencing the actions of others. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 159-182.
GALLESE, V. Before and below “theory of mind”: embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, v. 362, n. 1480, p. 659-669, 2007.
GALLESE, V. Mirror neurons, embodied simulation, and the neural basis of social identification. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, v. 19, n. 5, p. 519-536, 2009a.
GALLESE, V. The two sides of mimesis Girard’s mimetic theory, embodied simulation and social identification. Journal of Consciousness Studies, v. 16, n. 4, p. 21-44, 2009b.
GALLESE, V.; KEYSERS, C.; RIZZOLATTI, G. A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, v. 8, n. 9, p. 396-403, 2004.
GOODMAN, N. Weisen der Welterzeugung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990. [Tradução de Ways of Worldmaking, 1978].
HUME, D. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano. In: BERKELEY; HUME. Tratado... São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980. (Os Pensadores).
KANT, I. Krtitik der reinen Vernunft. Darmstadt: WBG, 1983 [1781, 1787].
KUTAS, M. et al. Reading senseless sentences: Brain potentials reflect semantic incongruity. Science, v. 207, n. 4427, p. 203-205, 1980.
LIEBERMAN, P. Towards an evolutionary biology of language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
MARTIN, A. et al. Neural correlates of category-specific knowledge. Nature, n. 379, p. 649-652, 1995.
MATURANA, H. R.; VARELA, F. J. A árvore do conhecimento: as bases biológicas da compreensão humana. São Paulo: Palas Athena, 2001 [1992].
MOK, K. Mind-Reading AI Optimizes Images Reconstructed from Your Brain Waves. The New Stack. Mar. 2018. Disponível em: https://thenewstack.io/mind-reading-ai-optimizes-images-reconstructed-brain-waves/. Acesso em: 06 jun. 2021.
PERERA, R. A.; STEIN, S. A. How to make correct predictions in false belief tasks without attributing false beliefs: An analysis of alternative inferences and how to avoid them. Philosophies, v. 3, p. 1-11, 2018.
PERERA, R. A. Acessando representações mentais para predizer estímulos: como crenças modulam sinais cerebrais. 2017. 104 p. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) – Unisinos, São Leopoldo, 2017. Disponível em: http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/6253. Acesso em: 13 nov. 2021.
PRINZ, J. Furnishing the Mind. Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004.
PULVERMÜLLER, F. How neurons make meaning: Brain mechanisms for embodied and abstract-symbolic semantics. Trends in Cognitive Science, v. 17, n. 19, p. 427-482, 2013.
PULVERMÜLLER, F.; FADIGA, L. Active perception: sensorimotor circuits as a cortical basis for language. Nature Publishing Group, v. 11, n. 5, p. 351-360, 2010.
RIZZOLATTI, G.; SINIGAGLIA, C. The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, v. 11, n. 4, p. 264-274, 2010.
RORTY, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
SAXE, R. R.; KANWISHER, N. People thinking about thinking people: The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind.” NeuroImage, v. 19, n. 4, p. 1835-1842, 2003.
SAXE, R. R.; PELPHREY, K. A. Introduction to a special section of developmental social cognitive neuroscience. Child Development, v. 80, n. 4, p. 946-951, Jul./Aug. 2009.
TOMASELLO, R.; GARAGNANI, M.; WENNEKERS, T.; PULVERMÜLLER, F. Brain connections of words, perceptions and actions: A neurobiological model of spatio-temporal semantic activation in the human cortex. Neuropsychologia, v. 98, p. 111-129, 2017.
VARELA, F. J.; THOMPSON, E.; ROSCH, E. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge; London: The MIT Press, 1993.
YOUNG, L.; CAMPRODON, J. A.; HAUSER, M.; PASCUAL-LEONE, A.; SAXE, R. Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v. 107, n. 15, p. 6753-6758, 2010.
Recebido: 28/08/2022
Aceito: 03/02/2023
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This is an open access article published under a Creative Commons license.
Este é um artigo de acesso aberto distribuído sob os termos da Creative Commons Attribution License.