Por que não somos só o nosso cérebro: em defesa do enativismo
en defensa del enactivismo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2023.v46esp1.p207Palavras-chave:
enativismo, cognitivismo, representações mentais, faláciasResumo
No artigo “Por que somos o nosso cérebro: o enativismo posto em questão” (neste volume), Pereira e colaboradores levantam uma bateria de críticas ao enativismo, que é uma família de abordagens nas ciências cognitivas que confere centralidade ao corpo e à ação autônoma dos organismos nas explicações dos seus processos cognitivos. As investidas dos autores miram alguns conceitos centrais da proposta enativista, como conhecimento prático, corporificação (ou corporeidade) e regularidades sensório-motoras. Eu argumento que as críticas de Pereira et al. não procedem por razões diversas: algumas assumem o que querem provar, outras conferem peso excessivo a intuições sobre cenários ficcionais e, por fim, outras atacam espantalhos que não representam as posições enativistas. Nenhum dos pontos que levanto em defesa o enativismo são novos, mas considero importantes explicitá-los para tornar o debate sobre filosofia das ciências cognitivas mais claro.
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Recebido: 11/09/2022
Aceito: 03/01/2023
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