Metontology and Heidegger’s concern for the ontic after being and time:

challenging the a priori

Resumo

The Kehre (turn) in Heidegger’s thought has been greatly discussed and debated. The introduction of the notion of metontology (Metontologie) in 1927 has fruitfully informed this debate since it entails a concern for the ontic domain on the part of Heidegger that is not present in earlier works. The fact that this notion disappears right after being introduced, however, challenges its contribution to this debate. In this paper, I show that the disappearance of metontology does not imply the disappearance of Heidegger’s concern for the ontic, but the opposite. I will begin by presenting Freeman’s view of a tension between the ontic and the ontological in Heidegger’s thought in the mid-to-late 20s that results in the introduction of metontology in 1927. Later on, I will show that McNeill’s explanation of the disappearance of metontology as a consequence of Heidegger’s mid-30s view that the a priori projection of being is a withdrawal of being (Entzug des Seins), allows saying that this disappearance does not entail Heidegger’s sudden lack of concern for the ontic. By considering Heidegger’s analysis of ‘the mathematical’ in Die Frage nach dem Ding, I will finally argue that metontology disappears from Heidegger’s thought because its dependency upon ontology prevents it to account for his increasing concern for the ontic properly.