MONISMO. ANÓMALO?: DONALD DAVIDSON E O PROBLEMA DA CAUSALIDADE MENTAL
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https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2017.v9n20.06.p61Palabras clave:
Monismo anómalo, Causalidade, Eventos, Epifenomenismo, DescriçõesResumen
Em Mental Events, Donald Davidson propôs uma teoria que pretendia compatibilizar um monismo ontológico com a ausência de leis psicológicas estritas a que chamou de monismo anómalo. Neste artigo, analiso algumas das objeções que foram lançadas a esta teoria. Em particular, investigo se o monismo anómalo garante uma verdadeira eficácia causal ao mental. De forma a desenvolver tal propósito, começo por descrever a tese do monismo anómalo que visa a compatibilização de três princípios aparentemente opostos. Seguidamente, analiso a crítica de epifenomenismo segundo a qual o monismo anómalo não garante uma verdadeira eficácia causal ao mental. Argumento que embora esta crítica tenha sido assinalada por vários autores, ela não é válida. Por fim, afirmo que apesar desta objeção ser desacertada, o monismo anómalo não é uma teoria aceitável.Descargas
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