O PARA-MIM [FOR-ME-NESS] COMO CARACTERÍSTICA UNIVERSAL DA EXPERIÊNCIA CONSCIENTE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2017.v9n21.12.p147Keywords:
Zahavi, Kriegel, O Para-Mim, Experiência Consciente, ResenhaAbstract
Resenha de: ZAHAVI, D.; KRIEGEL, U. For-me-ness: what it is and what it is not. In: DAHLSTROM, D.; ELPIDOROU, A.; HOPP, W. (Eds.) Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: conceptual and empirical approaches. London: Routledge, 2015. P. 34- 53.References
BAYNE, T. The unity of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
BERMUDEZ, J. L. Bodily awareness and self-consciousness. In: GALLAGHER, S. (Ed.) The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 157-179.
CAMPBELL, J. Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process. The Monist, v. 82, n. 4, p. 609-625, 1999.
GALLAGHER, S. Self-reference and schizophrenia: a cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification. In: ZAHAVI, D. (Ed.) Exploring the self: philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000. p. 203-240.
HARMAN, G. The intrinsic quality of experience. In: TOMBERLIN, J. (Ed.) Philosophical perspectives 4. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1990. p. 31-52.
HUME, D. A treatise of human nature. London: John Noon, 1739.
KRIEGEL, U. Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, v. 33, n.1, p. 103-132, 2003.
KRIEGEL, U. Subjective consciousness: a self-representational theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
LANE, T. Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, v. 11, n. 2, p. 251-286, 2012.
METZINGER, T. Being no one. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
PRINZ, J. Waiting for the self. In: LIU, J.; PERRY, J. (Eds.) Consciousness and the self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 123-149.
ZAHAVI, D. Self and consciousness. In: ZAHAVI, D. (Ed.) Exploring the self. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000. p. 55-74.
ZAHAVI, D. Subjectivity and selfhood: investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
ZAHAVI, D. The experiential self: objections and clarifications. In: SIDERITS, M.; THOMPSON, E.; ZAHAVI, D. (Eds.) Self, no self? Perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. p. 56-78.
ZAHAVI, D. Self and other: exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
ZAHN, R., TALAZKO, J.; EBERT, D. Loss of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects in a case of right inferior temporal, parieto-occipital and precentral hypometabolism. Psychopathology, v. 41, n. 6, p. 397-402, 2008.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2018 Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.