THE THE PROBLEM OF SCIENTIFIC DEMARCATION AND THE STATUS OF METAPHYSICS IN POPPER'S CRITICAL RATIONALISM

Abstract

This article aims to present the main ideas surrounding the problem of scientific demarcation from the perspective of the philosopher of science Karl Popper. Firstly, it will seek to present the problem related to inductive reasoning, known as the problem of induction. Subsequently, Popper's demarcation criterion will be presented, namely, falsifiability and, finally, the treatment given to metaphysics. It is concluded that the criterion of falsifiability is characterised by its unilateral negative decisiveness, i.e. science should seek to falsify its theories and not verify them. This criterion enables a logical-deductive justification of the demarcation between scientific and metaphysical statements. Scientific knowledge comes to be understood as a corollary arising from conjectures and refutations.  Metaphysics is elevated to the category of rational criticism, as well as a contributor to scientific endeavour through metaphysical research programmes.