O PAPEL DO ARGUMENTO DA SEPARABILIDADE DAS PESSOAS EMRAWLS E NOZICK
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2024.v16n40.p97-127Keywords:
separateness of persons, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, liberalism, utilitarianism, libertarianismAbstract
Este artigo explora o papel crucial do argumento da separabilidade das pessoas nas teorias liberais, um conceito que autores liberais usam para contestar teorias agregativas, como o utilitarismo, e para fundamentar suas próprias perspectivas teóricas. O trabalho examina como John Rawls e Robert Nozick, os principais proponentes do liberalismo igualitário e do libertarianismo, respectivamente, utilizam e aprimoram esse conceito, principalmente para criticar o utilitarismo. O foco não é decidir qual uso teórico é superior, mas iluminar o raciocínio fundamental por trás e a importância dessa noção em cada teoria. O artigo começa com uma análise do trabalho de Rawls, particularmente o artigo "Justiça como Equidade" e a obra "Uma Teoria da Justiça", onde ele apresenta sua crítica mais notável ao utilitarismo. Em seguida, esclarece a interpretação de Nozick sobre o tópico. A conclusão resume os pontos-chave discutidos, fornecendo uma avaliação crítica e levantando questões sobre o desenvolvimento da noção de separabilidade das pessoas em ambas as teorias.
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