LYING IS A KIND OF DECEPTION / (MENTIRA É UM TIPO DE ENGANAÇÃO)

Autores

  • Felipe Castelo Branco Medeiros PhD Candidate Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2018.v10n23.05.p42

Resumo

Under the traditional view of lying, the concept is usually taken to be a deviant speech act with the following characteristics: (1) being insincere and (2) being done with the intention to deceive. On the recent literature, however, (2) has come under attack by a class of counter examples that purport to show that the traditional view has been misguided. In this essay, our objective is twofold, we intend to: (a) present Lackey’s defense of her take on the traditional conception; (b) present a different proposal about how to go about defending (2). This is important because, although we don’t agree with Lackey’s solution, we do agree that (2) is a necessary condition on a successful definition of lying, as evidenced by the fact that taking the deception clause out of [lying] leaves us with an overall loss of explanatory power with regards to a range of speech acts and the general ethics of communicative cooperation.

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Referências

BENTON, M. Lying, Belief and Knowledge. In: MEIBAUER, Jorg. (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming.

BORGES, R.; MEDEIROS, F. Unreasonable selfness. Veritas 61:492-502, 2016.

CARSON, T. L. Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

FALLIS, D. What is lying? The Journal of Philosophy 106: 29–56, 2009.

LACKEY, J. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

______. Lies and Deception: An unhappy divorce. Analysis 73: 236-248, 2013.

SORENSEN, R. Knowledge-lies. Analysis 70: 608–15, 2010.

______. Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 251–64, 2007.

TURRI, A.; TURRI, J. The Truth About Lying. Cognition 138: 161-168, 2015.

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Publicado

2018-07-28