REBATENDO O ARGUMENTO CAUSAL CONTRA O REALISMO INGÊNUO: UMA ANÁLISE DO PRINCÍPIO DE MESMAS CAUSAS/MESMOS EFEITOS DE ROBINSON
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2024.v16n40.p238-267Palavras-chave:
Realismo Ingênuo, Disjuntivismo, Argumento Causal, Howard Robinson, Mesmas Causas/Mesmos EfeitosResumo
O Realismo Ingênuo postula que as percepções envolvem a consciência direta de entidades independentes da mente. Essa perspectiva sobre a percepção é frequentemente elogiada por suas supostas vantagens sobre teorias concorrentes, incluindo sua capacidade de dar conta de aspectos cognitivos, epistêmicos e fenomenais. No entanto, o Realismo Ingênuo enfrenta objeções, especialmente provenientes do Argumento Causal. Uma versão específica desse argumento, proposta por Howard Robinson, e amplamente negligenciada no discurso acadêmico, é criticamente examinada aqui. No presente estudo, ela passou por inúmeras discussões exegéticas, revelando que sua proposição central afirma que os efeitos que compartilham o mesmo padrão causal geral devem ser intrinsecamente idênticos, entrando em conflito com o realismo ingênuo. Nossa avaliação crítica do argumento mostra que essa ideia é criticada por ser um princípio causal geral implausivelmente equivocado, considerando vários contraexemplos, especialmente sobreposição de padrões causais.
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