How are synthetic a priori juridical judgments possible?

Abstract

Transcendental Freedom is the foundation of practical freedom which, in turn, is the foundation of moral philosophy, which consists in the determination of the maxims of choice by the moral law arising from the will and the neutralization
of sensitive inclinations. But freedom is divided into internal freedom of choice, when will determine the matter of choice, establishing ends that are also duties, which makes the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue a maxim of ends and, therefore, a synthetic a priori judgment; and freedom in the external use of choice, which determines the form of the choice, which allows the choice to exist according to any ends, as long as the action occurs only in accordance with duty, but not from duty, which makes the principle of right possible. After trying to formulate the principle of right as a synthetic a priori judgment in the form of a categorical imperative, Kant abandons this project and states that the principle of right is an analytical judgment because it can be deduced directly from freedom through the principle of contradiction, a since, in the right, the ends of the action can be any. However, if the right is deduced from an analytical judgment, it cannot belong to critical philosophy, as it is necessary to show that metaphysics is composed of a priori synthetic judgments, therefore, there must be another principle from which the majority of juridical duties are deduced as synthetic a priori judgments. Therefore, Kant introduced the unified will of the people, as an a priori synthetic judgment capable of showing how empirical possession, authorized by the juridical postulate of practical reason, in the state of nature, can be transformed into merely juridical possession, as an intelligible possession, without detaining the object, in the civil status, expanding practical reason beyond simple freedom, which explains how synthetic a priori juridical
judgments are possible.