Another Cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabibs Antwort auf Kants philosophisches Konzept des Kosmopolitismus

Autores

  • Marita RAINSBOROUGH

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501/2014.v2n1.3813

Resumo

The essay takes Seyla Benhabib's philosophical concepts as an example upon which to base an examination of the question of which aspects of Kantian philosophy are relevant to the current theory of cosmopolitanism; the way in which thistheory references Kant and whether Kant's cosmopolitan parameters have been re-interpreted. It can be demonstrated that Seyla Benhabib's Another Cosmopolitanism makes significant alterations to the Kantian model. Taking Kant's view of the autonomy of the subject, human rationality and the moral-practical fundamental characteristics of humans as her starting point, she overcomes formal universalism by incorporating the specific other, the dialogue-based model of procedural integration of common norms, rights and institutions and the negotiating process of democratic iteration to regulate the conditions for inclusion and exclusion to ensure world citizens' rights. By doing so Benhabib is able to provide a new substantiation of cosmopolitanism without referencing the teleological principle of nature or neglecting the human morality which focuses on its immediate environment. Cosmopolitanism is conceived of as a utopian project which provides human beings worldwide with a variety of practical-moral objectives upon which to base their specific actions. Critical alternative theories such as the radical democratic cosmopolitanism of Ingram and Honig's antagonistic cosmopolitanism are unable to refute Benhabib's Another Cosmopolitanism as long as the latter is, as intended by the philosopher, understood as a utopian concept.

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Publicado

2021-09-16

Como Citar

RAINSBOROUGH, M. (2021). Another Cosmopolitanism. Seyla Benhabibs Antwort auf Kants philosophisches Konzept des Kosmopolitismus. Estudos Kantianos [EK], 2(1). https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501/2014.v2n1.3813

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Artigos / Articles