The Motivation of Acting from Duty

Abstract

Taking into account that in Kantian moral philosophy the norms and moral principles are objectively set out by the reason, we aim to explain how they can become subjectively valid, in other sense, how they become motives of the action. Our argue is divided into two parts: (i) we make a historical and conceptual approach of the Humean influence on the motivational debate, highlighting the way that he affects Kant and establishing the three conceptions of moral motivational we consider essential in this period; (ii) we explain the formal relation between the objective grounds and the subjective grounds of determination of the will - the relation between the "duty" and the "motive of duty".

Recebido / Received: 25 de janeiro de 2020 / 25 January 2020
Aceito / Accepted: 20 de fevereiro de 2020 / 20 February 2020.