Shame and sense of shame in the work of I. Kant.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2019.v7n2.06.p73Keywords:
shame, sense of shame, BeobachtungenAbstract
This essay contradicts a wide-spread tendency, even in classic interpretations of his practical philosophy, to isolate Kant’s famous moral and decisional rigorism against the influence of emotions or sensible, subjective, impressions. A careful examination of Kant’s work on Antropology, strictly construed, as well as of some fundamental notes from the so-called pre-critical period allows us to grasp that and how Kant actually ascribed a fundamental role in moral matters even to a negative emotion (or affective disposition) like shame.
Recebido / Received: 8.7.2019.
Aprovado / Approved: 22.9.2019.
Downloads
Additional Files
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2019 Kantian Studies (EK)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.