La notion de ‘système’ chez Wolff, Lambert et Kant

Abstract

Kant’s conception of a ‘system’ doesn’t correspond to that of his predecessors, nor has it much in common with
the actual meaning of systematicity. We discuss the particularities of Kant’s account by showing how it differs from Wolff’s and Lambert’s and how it is closely linked with his understanding of the structure of synthetic a priori cognition. We then argue that the idea of system functions as a leading threat in the Opus postumum, by illustrating how it reappears in each of the thirteen evolving projects that constitute Kant’s last “work”. This brings us to a reconsideration of the role of the transcendental ideas.
Although the latter do lack objective reality, they are not without value for objectivity. Indeed, the human quest for knowledge can only lead to objective cognitions if the latter are embedded in a system that is ultimately grounded on an idea of reason itself.